Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is part of a broader, and more dangerous, confrontation with the West THE ECONOMIST FEB. 15, 2015

THE pens were on the table in Minsk, Belarus’s capital, for the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine to sign a deal to end a year-long war fuelled by Russia and fought by its proxies.

But on February 12th, after all-night talks, they were put away. “No good news,” said Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine’s president. Instead there will be a ceasefire from February 15th. A tentative agreement has been reached to withdraw heavy weaponry.

But Russia looks sure to be able to keep open its border with Ukraine and sustain the flow of arms and people. The siege of Debaltseve, a strategic transport hub held by Ukrainian forces, continues. Russia is holding military exercises on its side of the border. Crimea was not even mentioned.

Meanwhile the IMF has said it will lend Ukraine $17.5 billion to prop up its economy. But Mr Putin seems to be relying on a familiar Russian tactic of exhausting his negotiating counterparts and taking two steps forward, one step back. He is counting on time and endurance to bring the collapse and division of Ukraine and a revision of the post-cold war world order.

Nearly a quarter-century after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West faces a greater threat from the East than at any point during the cold war. Even during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Soviet leaders were constrained by the Politburo and memories of the second world war.

Now, according to Russia’s chief propagandist, Dmitry Kiselev, even a decision about the use of nuclear arms “will be taken personally by Mr Putin, who has the undoubted support of the Russian people”. Bluff or not, this reflects the Russian elite’s perception of the West as a threat to the very existence of the Russian state.

In this view Russia did not start the war in Ukraine, but responded to Western aggression. The Maidan uprising and ousting of Viktor Yanukovych as Ukraine’s president were engineered by American special services to move NATO closer to Russia’s borders.

Once Mr Yanukovych had gone, American envoys offered Ukraine’s interim government $25 billion to place missile defences on the Russian border, in order to shift the balance of nuclear power towards America. Russia had no choice but to act.

Even without Ukraine, Mr Putin has said, America would have found some other excuse to contain Russia.

Ukraine, therefore, was not the cause of Russia’s conflict with the West, but its consequence. Mr Putin’s purpose is not to rebuild the Soviet empire–he knows this is impossible–but to protect Russia’s sovereignty.

By this he means its values, the most important of which is a monopoly on state power.

Behind Russia’s confrontation with the West lies a clash of ideas. On one side are human rights, an accountable bureaucracy and democratic elections; on the other an unconstrained state that can sacrifice its citizens’ interests to further its destiny or satisfy its rulers’ greed. Both under communism and before it, the Russian state acquired religious attributes. It is this sacred state which is under threat.

Mr Putin sits at its apex. “No Putin–no Russia,” a deputy chief of staff said recently. His former KGB colleagues–the Committee of State Security–are its guardians, servants and priests, and entitled to its riches. Theirs is not a job, but an elite and hereditary calling. Expropriating a private firm’s assets to benefit a state firm is therefore not an act of corruption.

When thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets demanding a Western-European way of life, the Kremlin saw this as a threat to its model of governance. Alexander Prokhanov, a nationalist writer who backs Russia’s war in Ukraine, compares European civilisation to a magnet attracting Ukraine and Russia. Destabilising Ukraine is not enough to counter that force: the magnet itself must be neutralised.

Russia feels threatened not by any individual European state, but by the European Union and NATO, which it regards as expansionist. It sees them as “occupied” by America, which seeks to exploit Western values to gain influence over the rest of the world.

America “wants to freeze the order established after the Soviet collapse and remain an absolute leader, thinking it can do whatever it likes, while others can do only what is in that leader’s interests,” Mr Putin said recently. “Maybe some want to live in a semi-occupied state, but we do not.”

Russia has taken to arguing that it is not fighting Ukraine, but America in Ukraine. The Ukrainian army is just a foreign legion of NATO, and American soldiers are killing Russian proxies in the Donbas. Anti-Americanism is not only the reason for war and the main pillar of state power, but also an ideology that Russia is trying to export to Europe, as it once exported communism.

Anti-Westernism has been dressed not in communist clothes, but in imperial and even clerical ones (see page 77). “We see how many Euro-Atlantic countries are in effect turning away from their roots, including their Christian values,” said Mr Putin in 2013.

Russia, by contrast, “has always been a state civilisation held together by the Russian people, the Russian language, Russian culture and the Russian Orthodox church.” The Donbas rebels are fighting not only the Ukrainian army, but against a corrupt Western way of life in order to defend Russia’s distinct world.

Mistaken hopes

Many in the West equate the end of communism with the end of the cold war. In fact, by the time the Soviet Union fell apart, Marxism-Leninism was long dead. Stalin replaced the ideals of internationalism, equality and social justice that the Bolsheviks had proclaimed in 1917 with imperialism and state dominance over all spheres of life. Mikhail Gorbachev’s revolution consisted not in damping down Marxism but in proclaiming the supremacy of universal human values over the state, opening up Russia to the West.

Nationalists, Stalinists, communists and monarchists united against Mr Gorbachev. Anti-Americanism had brought Stalinists and nationalists within the Communist Party closer together. When communism collapsed they united against Boris Yeltsin and his attempts to make Russia “normal”, by which he meant a Western-style free-market democracy.

By 1993, when members of this coalition were ejected by pro-Yeltsin forces from the parliament building they had occupied in Moscow, they seemed defeated. Yet nationalism has resurfaced. Those who fought Yeltsin and his ideas were active in the annexation of Crimea and are involved in the war in south-east Ukraine.

Alexander Borodai, the first “prime minister” of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, who fought with anti-Yeltsin forces, hails Mr Putin as the leader of the nationalist movement in Russia today.

Yet for a few years after Mr Putin came to power he built close relations with NATO. In his first two presidential terms, rising living standards helped buy acceptance of his monopoly on state power and reliance on ex-KGB men; now that the economy is shrinking, the threat of war is needed to legitimise his rule.

He forged his alliance with Orthodox nationalists only during mass street protests by Westernised liberals in 2012, when he returned to the Kremlin. Instead of tear gas, he has used nationalist, imperialist ideas, culminating in the annexation of Crimea and the slow subjugation of south-east Ukraine.

Hard power and soft

Mr Putin’s preferred method is “hybrid warfare”: a blend of hard and soft power. A combination of instruments, some military and some non-military, choreographed to surprise, confuse and wear down an opponent, hybrid warfare is ambiguous in both source and intent, making it hard for multinational bodies such as NATO and the EU to craft a response.

But without the ability to apply hard power, Russia’s version of soft power would achieve little. Russia “has invested heavily in defence,” says NATO’s new secretary-general, a former Norwegian prime minister, Jens Stoltenberg. “It has shown it can deploy forces at very short notice…above all, it has shown a willingness to use force.”

Putin drew two lessons from his brief war in Georgia in 2008. The first was that Russia could deploy hard power in countries that had been in the Soviet Union and were outside NATO with little risk of the West responding with force.

The second, after a slapdash campaign, was that Russia’s armed forces needed to be reformed. Military modernisation became a personal mission to redress “humiliations” visited by an “overweening” West on Russia since the cold war ended.

According to IHS Jane’s, a defence consultancy, by next year Russia’s defence spending will have tripled in nominal terms since 2007, and it will be halfway through a ten-year, 20 trillion rouble ($300 billion) programme to modernise its weapons.

New types of missiles, bombers and submarines are being readied for deployment over the next few years. Spending on defence and security is expected to climb by 30% this year and swallow a more than a third of the federal budget.

As well as money for combat aircraft, helicopters, armoured vehicles and air-defence systems, about a third of the budget has been earmarked to overhaul Russia’s nuclear forces. A revised military doctrine signed by Mr Putin in December identified “reinforcement of NATO’s offensive capacities directly on Russia’s borders, and measures taken to deploy a global anti-missile defence system” in central Europe as the greatest threats Russia faces.

In itself, that may not be cause for alarm in the West. Russian nuclear doctrine has changed little since 2010, when the bar for first use was slightly raised to situations in which “the very existence of the state is under threat”. That may reflect growing confidence in Russia’s conventional forces.

But Mr Putin is fond of saying that nobody should try to shove Russia around when it has one of the world’s biggest nuclear arsenals. Mr Kiselev puts it even more bluntly: “During the years of romanticism [ie, detente], the Soviet Union undertook not to use nuclear weapons first. Modern Russian doctrine does not. The illusions are gone.”

Mr Putin still appears wedded to a strategy he conceived in 2000: threatening a limited nuclear strike to force an opponent (ie, America and its NATO allies) to withdraw from a conflict in which Russia has an important stake, such as in Georgia or Ukraine. Nearly all its large-scale military exercises in the past decade have featured simulations of limited nuclear strikes, including one on Warsaw.

Mr Putin has also been streamlining his armed forces, with the army recruiting 60,000 contract soldiers each year. Professionals now make up 30% of the force. Conscripts may bulk up the numbers, but for the kind of complex, limited wars Mr Putin wants to be able to win, they are pretty useless.

Ordinary contract soldiers are also still a long way behind special forces such as the GRU Spetsnaz (the “little green men” who went into Crimea without military insignia) and the elite airborne VDV troops, but they are catching up.

Boots on the ground

South-east Ukraine shows the new model army at work. Spetsnaz units first trained the Kremlin-backed separatist rebels in tactics and the handling of sophisticated Russian weapons. But when the Ukrainian government began to make headway in early summer, Russia had regular forces near the border to provide a calibrated (and still relatively covert) response.

It is hard to tell how many Russian troops have seen action in Ukraine, as their vehicles and uniforms carry no identifiers. But around 4,000 were sent to relieve Luhansk and Donetsk while threatening the coastal city of Mariupol–enough to convince Mr Poroshenko to draw his troops back.

Since November a new build-up of Russian forces has been under way. Ukrainian military intelligence reckons there may be 9,000 in their country (NATO has given no estimate). Another 50,000 are on the Russian side of the border.

Despite Mr Putin’s claim last year that he could “take Kiev in two weeks” if he wanted, a full-scale invasion and subsequent occupation is beyond Russia. But a Russian-controlled mini-state, Novorossiya, similar to Abkhazia and Transdniestria, could be more or less economically sustainable.

And it would end Ukraine’s hopes of ever regaining sovereignty over its territory other than on Russian terms, which would undoubtedly include staying out of the EU and NATO. Not a bad outcome for Mr Putin, and within reach with the hard power he controls.

The big fear for NATO is that Mr Putin turns his hybrid warfare against a member country. Particularly at risk are the Baltic states–Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania–two of which have large Russian-speaking minorities.

In January Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s previous secretary-general, said there was a “high probability” that Mr Putin would test NATO’s Article 5, which regards an attack on any member as an attack on all–though “he will be defeated” if he does so.

A pattern of provocation has been established that includes a big increase in the number of close encounters involving Russian aircraft and naval vessels, and snap exercises by Russian forces close to NATO’s northern and eastern borders. Last year NATO planes carried out more than 400 intercepts of Russian aircraft.

More than 150 were by the alliance’s beefed-up Baltic air-policing mission–four times as many as in 2013. In the first nine months of the year, 68 “hot” identifications and interdictions occurred along the Lithuanian border alone. Latvia recorded more than 150 incidents of Russian planes entering its airspace.

There have also been at least two near-misses between Russian military aircraft and Swedish airliners. This is dangerous stuff: Russian pilots do not file flight plans. They fly with transponders switched off, which makes them invisible to civil radar. On January 28th two Russian, possibly nuclear-armed, strategic bombers flew down the English Channel, causing havoc to commercial aviation. Such behaviour is intended to test Western air defences, and was last seen in the cold war. Mr Stoltenberg calls it “risky and unjustified”.

Since 2013, when Russia restarted large-scale snap military exercises, at least eight have been held. In December the Kremlin ordered one in Kaliningrad, an exclave that borders Lithuania and Poland, both NATO members. It mobilised 9,000 soldiers, more than 55 navy ships and every type of military aircraft. “This pattern of behaviour can be used to hide intent,” says General Philip Breedlove, NATO’s most senior commander. “What is it masking? What is it conditioning us for?”

A huge problem for NATO is that most of what Russia might attempt will be below the radar of traditional collective defence. According to Mr Stoltenberg, deciding whether an Article 5 attack has taken place means both recognising what is going on and knowing who is behind it.

“We need more intelligence and better situational awareness,” he says; but adds that NATO allies accept that if the arrival of little green men can be attributed “to an aggressor nation, it is an Article 5 action and then all the assets of NATO come to bear.”

For all the rhetoric of the cold war, the Soviet Union and America had been allies and winners in the second world war and felt a certain respect for each other. The Politburo suffered from no feelings of inferiority. In contrast, Mr Putin and his KGB men came out of the cold war as losers.

What troubles Mr Stoltenberg greatly about Mr Putin’s new, angry Russia is that it is harder to deal with than the old Soviet Union. As a Norwegian, used to sharing an Arctic border with Russia, he says that “even during the coldest period of the cold war we were able to have a pragmatic conversation with them on many security issues”. Russia had “an interest in stability” then, “but not now”.

Meddling and perverting

Destabilisation is also being achieved in less military ways. Wielding power or gaining influence abroad–through antiestablishment political parties, disgruntled minority groups, media outlets, environmental activists, supporters in business, propagandist “think-tanks”, and others–has become part of the Kremlin’s hybrid-war strategy. This perversion of “soft power” is seen by Moscow as a vital complement to military engagement.

Certainly Russia is not alone in abusing soft power. The American government’s aid agency, USAID, has planted tweets in Cuba and the Middle East to foster dissent. And Mr Putin has hinted that Russia needs to fight this way because America and others are already doing so, through “pseudo-NGOs”, CNN and human-rights groups.

At home Russian media, which are mostly state-controlled, churn out lies and conspiracy theories. Abroad, the main conduit for the Kremlin’s world view is RT, a TV channel set up in 2005 to promote a positive view of Russia that now focuses on making the West look bad.

It uses Western voices: far-left anti-globalists, far-right nationalists and disillusioned individuals. It broadcasts in English, Arabic and Spanish and is planning German- and French-language channels.

It claims to reach 700m people worldwide and 2.7m hotel rooms. Though it is not a complete farce, it has broadcast a string of false stories, such as one speculating that America was behind the Ebola epidemic in west Africa.

The Kremlin is also a sophisticated user of the internet and social media. It employs hundreds of “trolls” to garrison the comment sections and Twitter feeds of the West. The point is not so much to promote the Kremlin’s views, but to denigrate opposition figures, and foreign governments and institutions, and to sow fear and confusion.

Vast sums have been thrown at public-relations and lobbying firms to improve Russia’s image abroad–among them Ketchum, based in New York, which helped place an op-ed by Mr Putin in the New York Times. And it can rely on some of its corporate partners to lobby against policies that would hurt Russian business.

The West’s willingness to shelter Russian money, some of it gained corruptly, demoralises the Russian opposition while making the West more dependent on the Kremlin. Russian money has had a poisonous effect closer to home, too. Russia wields soft power in the Baltics partly through its “compatriots policy”, which entails financial support for Russian-speaking minorities abroad.

econ 2The Economist

Mr Putin’s most devious strategy, however, is to destabilise the EU through fringe political parties (see box).

Russia’s approach to ideology is fluid: it supports both far-left and far-right groups. As Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss put it in “The menace of unreality”, a paper on Russian soft power: “The aim is to exacerbate divides [in the West] and create an echo-chamber of Kremlin support.”

Disruptive politics

Far-right groups are seduced by the idea of Moscow as a counterweight to the EU, and by its law-and-order policies. Its stance on homosexuality and promotion of “traditional” moral values appeal to religious conservatives. The far left likes the talk of fighting American hegemony.

Russia’s most surprising allies, however, are probably Europe’s Greens. They are opposed to shale-gas fracking and nuclear power–as is Moscow, because both promise to lessen Europe’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Mr Rasmussen has accused Russia of “sophisticated” manipulation of information to hobble fracking in Europe, though without producing concrete evidence.

There is circumstantial evidence in Bulgaria, which in 2012 cancelled a permit for Chevron to explore for shale gas after anti-fracking protests. Some saw Russia’s hand in these, possibly to punish the pro-European government of the time, which sought to reduce its reliance on Russian energy (Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled gas giant, supplies 90% of Bulgaria’s gas).

Previously, Bulgaria had been expected to transport Russian oil through its planned South Stream pipeline, and its parliament had approved a bill that would have exempted the project from awkward EU rules. Much of it had been written by Gazprom, and the construction contract was to go to a firm owned by Gennady Timchenko, an oligarch now under Western sanctions.

Gazprom offered to finance the pipeline and to sponsor a Bulgarian football team. The energy minister at the time later claimed he had been offered bribes by a Russian envoy to smooth the project’s passage. Though European opposition means it has now been scrapped, the episode shows the methods Moscow uses to protect its economic interests.

In all this Mr Putin is evidently acting not only for Russia’s sake, but for his own. Mr Borodai, the rebel ideologue in Donetsk, says that if necessary the Russian volunteers who are fighting today in Donbas will tomorrow defend their president on the streets of Moscow.

Yet, although Mr Putin may believe he is using nationalists, the nationalists believe they are using him to consolidate their power. What they aspire to, with or without Mr Putin, is that Russians rally behind the nationalist state and their leader to take on Western liberalism. This is not a conflict that could have been resolved in Minsk.

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Solar and Wind Energy Start to Win on Price vs. Conventional Fuels NOVEMBER 23, 2014 AT 7:57 PM NYT > Business Day / By DIANE CARDWELL

For the solar and wind industries in the United States, it has been a long-held dream: to produce energy at a cost equal to conventional sources like coal and natural gas.

That day appears to be dawning.

The cost of providing electricity from wind and solar power plants has plummeted over the last five years, so much so that in some markets renewable generation is now cheaper than coal or natural gas.

Utility executives say the trend has accelerated this year, with several companies signing contracts, known as power purchase agreements, for solar or wind at prices below that of natural gas, especially in the Great Plains and Southwest, where wind and sunlight are abundant.

Those prices were made possible by generous subsidies that could soon diminish or expire, but recent analyses show that even without those subsidies, alternative energies can often compete with traditional sources.

In Texas, Austin Energy signed a deal this spring for 20 years of output from a solar farm at less than 5 cents a kilowatt-hour. In September, the Grand River Dam Authority in Oklahoma announced its approval of a new agreement to buy power from a new wind farm expected to be completed next year. Grand River estimated the deal would save its customers roughly $50 million from the project.

And, also in Oklahoma, American Electric Power ended up tripling the amount of wind power it had originally sought after seeing how low the bids came in last year.

“Wind was on sale — it was a Blue Light Special,” said Jay Godfrey, managing director of renewable energy for the company. He noted that Oklahoma, unlike many states, did not require utilities to buy power from renewable sources.

“We were doing it because it made sense for our ratepayers,” he said.

According to a study by the investment banking firm Lazard, the cost of utility-scale solar energy is as low as 5.6 cents a kilowatt-hour, and wind is as low as 1.4 cents. In comparison, natural gas comes at 6.1 cents a kilowatt-hour on the low end and coal at 6.6 cents. Without subsidies, the firm’s analysis shows, solar costs about 7.2 cents a kilowatt-hour at the low end, with wind at 3.7 cents.

“It is really quite notable, when compared to where we were just five years ago, to see the decline in the cost of these technologies,” said Jonathan Mir, a managing director at Lazard, which has been comparing the economics of power generation technologies since 2008.

Mr. Mir noted there were hidden costs that needed to be taken into account for both renewable energy and fossil fuels. Solar and wind farms, for example, produce power intermittently — when the sun is shining or the wind is blowing — and that requires utilities to have power available on call from other sources that can respond to fluctuations in demand. Alternately, conventional power sources produce pollution, like carbon emissions, which face increasing restrictions and costs.

But in a straight comparison of the costs of generating power, Mr. Mir said that the amount solar and wind developers needed to earn from each kilowatt-hour they sell from new projects was often “essentially competitive with what would otherwise be had from newly constructed conventional generation.”

Experts and executives caution that the low prices do not mean wind and solar farms can replace conventional power plants anytime soon.

“You can’t dispatch it when you want to,” said Khalil Shalabi, vice president for energy market operations and resource planning at Austin Energy, which is why the utility, like others, still sees value in combined-cycle gas plants, even though they may cost more. Nonetheless, he said, executives were surprised to see how far solar prices had fallen. “Renewables had two issues: One, they were too expensive, and they weren’t dispatchable. They’re not too expensive anymore.”

According to the Solar Energy Industries Association, the main trade group, the price of electricity sold to utilities under long-term contracts from large-scale solar projects has fallen by more than 70 percent since 2008, especially in the Southwest.

The average upfront price to install standard utility-scale projects dropped by more than a third since 2009, with higher levels of production.

The price drop extends to homeowners and small businesses as well; last year, the prices for residential and commercial projects fell by roughly 12 to 15 percent from the year before.

The wind industry largely tells the same story, with prices dropping by more than half in recent years. Emily Williams, manager of industry data and analytics at the American Wind Energy Association, a trade group, said that in 2013 utilities signed “a record number of power purchase agreements and what ended up being historically low prices.”

Especially in the interior region of the country, from North Dakota down to Texas, where wind energy is particularly robust, utilities were able to lock in long contracts at 2.1 cents a kilowatt-hour, on average, she said. That is down from prices closer to 5 cents five years ago.

“We’re finding that in certain regions with certain wind projects that these are competing or coming in below the cost of even existing generation sources,” she said.

Both industries have managed to bring down costs through a combination of new technologies and approaches to financing and operations. Still, the industries are not ready to give up on their government supports just yet.

Already, solar executives are looking to extend a 30 percent federal tax credit that is set to fall to 10 percent at the end of 2016. Wind professionals are seeking renewal of a production tax credit that Congress has allowed to lapse and then reinstated several times over the last few decades.

Senator Ron Wyden, the Oregon Democrat, who for now leads the Finance Committee, held a hearing in September over the issue, hoping to push a process to make the tax treatment of all energy forms more consistent.

“Congress has developed a familiar pattern of passing temporary extensions of those incentives, shaking hands and heading home,” he said at the hearing. “But short-term extensions cannot put renewables on the same footing as the other energy sources in America’s competitive marketplace.”

Where that effort will go now is anybody’s guess, though, with Republicans in control of both houses starting in January.

Two Big Trends Will Fuel The Renewable Energy Boom For Years

This is the big picture.

Carlos Barria/Reuters
The renewable energy revolution is happening faster than many expected.
According to recent report from Citi Research, renewables will continue their market share grabs from coal and gas forSome of this can be explained by the need for cleaner energy.

“Environmental pressures on coal consumption are rising not only in Europe and North America, but also in China and other emerging markets,” according to the Citi analyst’s note. “The most significant change has been in China, where increasing regulations and the establishment of carbon markets should limit the attractiveness of coal power. Moreover, the country is aggressively pursuing an ‘everything but coal’ development plan for the power sector, with rapid growth in capacity for alternative energy sources.”

Coal power plants are increasingly being pushed into “retirement.”

Most people have been expecting natural gas to be coal’s major substitute. However, Citi’s forecast suggests that growth in natgas demand is going to be way less than previously anticipated.

Renewables should take ever-increasing amounts of market share in an environment like this, according to the report.

In the figure above, you can see that coal’s utilized capacity (measured in GW) is projected drop from 198 GW in 2011 down to 181 GW by 2020. Natural gas slightly increases from 115 GW in 2011 to 132 GW by 2020, although that number is less than previously expected (and you can see there’s a dip from 2012 to 2014). Nuclear sees no major change in either direction, starting at 90 GW and ending at 92 GW.

On the flip side, renewables in 2011 were at 50 GW and are expected to rise to 68 GW by 2020.

two reasons.

First, renewables are rapidly becoming cost-effective, and second, environmental restrictions are becoming an increasingly high hurdle.

Renewables Are Getting Cheaper

Thanks to tech advances, the cost of renewables is finally dropping to affordable levels, which is allowing them to proliferate, according to Citi.

“Costs for solar and wind energy are falling rapidly, with learning rates of around 30% for solar and 7.4% for wind,” the report states.

Wind power has already achieved cost parity with the most expensive coal power plants in Europe (slightly above $80/MWh), and by the end of the decade it’s expected to reach cost parity with the majority of plants (around $70/MWh).

Solar is still the most expensive major electricity source at the moment (around $160/MWh), but Citi is projecting that by 2020 solar will drop to wind’s current prices (slightly above $80/MWh).

“Natural gas has already eroded coal’s cost competitiveness in the US, with decreasing costs for wind, solar and ex-US natural gas to follow,” according to Citi.

Below is the global electricity cost curve.

Citi Research
Environmental Restrictions Favor Renewables

Historically there has been a correlation between economic growth and electricity demand growth. But right now we’re seeing the opposite: during a period of economic growth, electricity demand growth has been relatively flat or declined for some regions.

Some of this can be explained by the need for cleaner energy.

“Environmental pressures on coal consumption are rising not only in Europe and North America, but also in China and other emerging markets,” according to the Citi analyst’s note. “The most significant change has been in China, where increasing regulations and the establishment of carbon markets should limit the attractiveness of coal power. Moreover, the country is aggressively pursuing an ‘everything but coal’ development plan for the power sector, with rapid growth in capacity for alternative energy sources.”

Coal power plants are increasingly being pushed into “retirement.”

Most people have been expecting natural gas to be coal’s major substitute. However, Citi’s forecast suggests that growth in natgas demand is going to be way less than previously anticipated.

Renewables should take ever-increasing amounts of market share in an environment like this, according to the report.

In the figure above, you can see that coal’s utilized capacity (measured in GW) is projected drop from 198 GW in 2011 down to 181 GW by 2020. Natural gas slightly increases from 115 GW in 2011 to 132 GW by 2020, although that number is less than previously expected (and you can see there’s a dip from 2012 to 2014). Nuclear sees no major change in either direction, starting at 90 GW and ending at 92 GW.

On the flip side, renewables in 2011 were at 50 GW and are expected to rise to 68 GW by 2020.

Large swathes of UK to be opened up for shale drilling

Telegraph.co.uk

Wednesday 18 December 2013

Large swathes of UK to be opened up for shale drilling, with communities where fracking takes place to receive £100,000, even if no gas is produced

A gas ring on a domestic stove powered by natural gas is seen alight on January 3. 2005, Manchester, England

A shale gas boom has transformed US energy markets, sending gas prices to record low levels Photo: Getty Images
Emily Gosden

By , Energy Editor

7:00AM GMT 10 Dec 20

large swathes of Britain will be opened up for shale gas drilling under plans due to be announced next week, with local communities promised £100,000 in benefits for every well subjected to fracking – even if no gas is produced.

Ministers are preparing to identify thousands of square miles of land across the country that they believe are rich in shale and should be explored by gas companies.

Michael Fallon, the energy minister, will say the government is “widening the search for shale” and has warned that households “right across the south” should prepare for fracking near their homes.

The identification of provisional “licensing areas” is likely to reignite controversy over fracking, the process of pumping water, sand and chemicals into the ground at high pressure to extract gas trapped in rocks.

The Government will today attempt to smooth the way for the plans by confirming a package of benefits for local communities, including the £100,000 upfront payment for any fracking – even if the process is unsuccessful and no gas is produced.

If fracking is successful, communities will then be handed one per cent of revenues the company makes from selling gas – which could see them reap benefits of up to £10 million.

Ministers hope the benefits will help assuage fears of Conservative MPs with constituencies in the south of England who are worried at public hostility to fracking, amid concerns about the impact on the landscape and environment.

The Treasury will on Tuesday publish draft legislation to introduce tax breaks for shale gas companies – announced in the Autumn Statement last week – in an attempt to entice international gas companies to fund drilling in the UK.

“The UK is sitting on significant amounts of shale and the potential prize for energy security and investment is huge. This gives companies the huge incentive to step up the search for shale and find out what is recoverable,” Mr Fallon said.

“Recent reports have tackled public concerns about water contamination and usage, as well as confirming that the risks to public health are low. We have robust regulation in place and now is the the time to press ahead.”

The Chancellor last week said that shale gas could bring “thousands of jobs, billions of pounds of business investment, and lower energy bills”.

However, only a relatively small proportion of Britain – about 7,300 square miles – has so far been licensed for oil and gas drilling. This includes parts of Cheshire, Lancashire, Yorkshire, Surrey and Sussex, where drilling for oil at Balcombe by Cuadrilla this summer caused fierce protests.

In May ministers commissioned consultants AMEC to carry out a “strategic environment assessment” of a huge area of Britain to help the Government assess which other areas are suitable to open up for drilling.

Campaign group Greenpeace, which opposes fracking, says that the areas being assessed cover some 32,000 square miles.

The plans set out this month will drastically increase the area available for potential fracking.

Oil and gas companies will then compete for rights to drill in the areas in a “licensing round” next year.

Once they have drilling rights from the government, companies would still then have to seek a further series of permits from government as well as access from landowners and planning permission before any fracking could take place.

A British Geological Survey study earlier this year revealed that shale gas trapped in the rocks under northern England and Wales alone could be enough to fuel the UK for more than 40 years. However, much of this area cannot be explored because it has not yet been licensed for drilling.

The Future Of Shale Development Worldwide, In Three Charts

world shale map

You may have seen the above map showing worldwide shale basins. It seems like a lot of other nations could replicate America’s shale boom if they only put their minds to it.

But while Mother Earth may have generously distributed her deposits of unconventional resources, she and Man have also conspired to make them not all equally accessible.

Scott Gruber at AllianceBernstein has created three annotated charts showing the amount of known shale reserves for all major countries, and the barriers to companies’ ability to drill there.

Check it out:

Europe, who arguably needs it most as it faces an energy cost crisis, has put in place the greatest restrictions to accessing its reserves.

  world shale scene

Latin America, led by Argentina, will likely be runner-up to the North American boom. 

world shale scene

Asia, especially China, has great potential, but, for now at least, the rocks there are a bit more difficult to drill.

world shale scene

Case For Exporting Marcellus Shale Gas

Q&A: Industry Economist Makes the Case for Exports

JUNE 18, 2013 | 3:26 PM
BY 

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage tanks and a membrane-type tanker are seen at Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s Futtsu Thermal Power Station in Futtsu, east of Tokyo February 20, 2013. Japan's imports of LNG hit a monthly record of 8.23 million tonnes in January, on an increased need for fuel to generate electricity after the nuclear sector was hit by the Fukushima crisis.

ISSEI KATO / REUTERS/LANDOV

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage tanks and a membrane-type tanker are seen at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s Futtsu Thermal Power Station in Futtsu, east of Tokyo February 20, 2013. Japan’s imports of LNG hit a monthly record of 8.23 million tonnes in January, on an increased need for fuel to generate electricity after the nuclear sector was hit by the Fukushima crisis.

The nation’s new energy secretary Ernest Moniz spoke at an energy conference Monday, where he told the audience that applications for new natural gas export facilities would be decided upon by the end of the year. Gas producers want to sell their fuel overseas where it fetches a higher price. But before it gets shipped abroad, it has to be converted to its liquid form known as LNG – or liquefied natural gas. Building those facilities is expensive. The closest proposed LNG export terminal to the Marcellus Shale deposit is in Cove Point, Maryland. That could cost more than $3 billion dollars to convert from its former role as a natural gas import terminal. But domestic manufacturers and those who say U.S. security depends on keeping the fossil fuel stateside are pushing back. Environmentalists worry that exports will stimulate more production in states like Pennsylvania, where activists have been pushing to implement a drilling moratorium. StateImpact spoke to the chief economist of the American Petroleum Institute, John Felmy, about the future uses of natural gas, and the export issues.

A: Felmy: Well, Marcellus Shale could play a tremendous opportunity in terms of exports, because it’s such a vast deposit. Developing it can of course be used to supply other states, as we are doing now. But there is likely to be so much of it, that exporting it at a very good price would help in terms of keeping production going.

Q:  Phillips: Right now we have the price of natural gas at about $4 per million btu [British Thermal Units] here domestically. And what are we seeing oversees?

A: Felmy: Well in Europe, it’s about $12 per million BTU. But in Asia, it’s as much as $17 or $18 because of the challenges that Japan faces with the Fukushima plants.

Q: Phillips: And I know that the industry is getting a lot of push back from manufacturers who are concerned that if you start exporting natural gas the price for them is going to be too high. And what they have been saying the low price in natural gas has allowed them to come back to the US, and that they are seeing a manufacturing renaissance, because of natural gas prices being so low.

A: Felmy: I think there is enough to go around because all indications are, as the economists would say, is that the supply curve is really flat. In other words, when you have an increase in demand from exports you don’t kind of have a sharp increase in price. And if you look at the drilling data, you see that it tends to support that conclusion.

Q: Phillips: And why is that?

A: Felmy: It is because it is a huge resource, and the industry has been so creative at improving technology, such that we have gotten so much more gas from areas that we’ve never dreamed of. Where ten years ago we were talking about building all these LNG import terminals, and you had all these terminals built and so that was the consensus and everyone from Alan Greenspan on down.

Q: Phillips: The price of natural gas has gone up and down and up and down. And when you think about how much it costs to build an export facility, The Dominion proposal at Cove Point, Maryland is about $3.4 billion dollars, how do you manage that risk? It seems like a pretty risky thing.

A: Felmy: Lets let the market work. Lets not have government intervention. It’s the investors who are going to be taking the risk and things could change, but right now the U.S. is so far ahead of other countries, even though many other countries have huge deposits of shale gas, that we are going to have that opportunity for quite a while.

And so, if you look at the major competition internationally, right now it’s Australia and their costs have increased significantly. And if you look at the deposits in other areas like China, Argentina, and Russia they are large, but because of issues of rule of law, and ownership of the resource, because in most countries except for the United States, the government owns that gas. Here in the US private individuals can [own that gas]. Such factors are reasons why we are ahead and why we are likely to stay ahead.

Q: Phillips: So talk to me about the end user here, how feasible is it that we are going to be seeing cars run on natural gas?

A: Felmy: Well, only 3% of natural gas supply is being used in cars right now. It’s primarily fleets, busses, things like that. So you can expand the car fleet with natural gas, but it is very expensive.  So, it’s about $8,000 to convert car, at that level of expense the car will expire before you get your money back.

But for heavy duty trucks and fleets of cabs, that is a very viable option. We are also going to see a lot of growth in electric power generation. And because of emission restrictions we are already seeing a huge shift from coal to natural gas. We’re incidentally seeing a shift from nuclear to natural gas. For example, there’s a [nuclear] plant out in California, the San Onofre, they decided not to restart. Well, the only other alternative to supply that electricity is with natural gas.

Marcellus Shale Exports Could Transform Global LNG Market

Marcellus Shale Exports Could Transform Global LNG Market

JULY 25, 2013 | 10:14 AM
BY 

The offshore loading pier at Dominion has not received a ship importing liquefied natural gas since January 2011.

LINDSAY LAZARSKI / WHYY/NEWSWORKS

The offshore loading pier at Dominion has not received a ship importing liquefied natural gas since January 2011.

In energy-hungry countries, all eyes are on Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale gas. In a dramatic shift from just five years ago, the U.S. is looking to export, instead of import natural gas. And if more natural gas starts getting shipped abroad, Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale could help change the global market for natural gas, and lighting homes in Tokyo.

The U.S. currently has two export terminals, one in Sabine Pass, Louisiana, and the ConocoPhillips LNG export terminal in North Cook Inlet, Alaska. The U.S. Department of Energy just gave preliminary approval for ConocoPhillips to expand its Freeport, Texas import terminal to export liquefied natural gas. About 17 other export proposals now await approval by the DOE, including the Cove Point liquefied natural gas import terminal operated by Dominion Resources.

 

Lindsay Lazarski / WHYY/Newsworks permalink

The offshore loading platform (background) as seen from the Cove Point Lighthouse.

THE “SWEET SPOT” YIELDS A GLUT

In areas of northeast Pennsylvania, drillers say they’ve hit the “sweet spot.” In a drill rig several stories up above a Susquehanna County forest, gas workers guide a giant diamond drill bit, about the size of a basketball, as it cuts through the rock thousands of feet below. Steve MacDonald is in charge of this operation for Cabot Oil and Gas.

Cabot Oil and Gas public relations officer George Stark with a drill rig worker outside of the "dog house."

SUSAN PHILLIPS / STATEIMPACT PENNSYLVANIA

Cabot Oil and Gas public relations officer George Stark with a drill rig worker outside of the “dog house.”

“This is what we call our dog house, this is the command center of our operations up here,” says MacDonald. “This is our driller Mr. Reed here. He shows you how fast we’re drilling, how fast we’re pumping so he understands what’s going on downhole.”

Downhole in places like this Cabot Oil and Gas well, the company has struck gold, so to speak. Cabot’s natural gasproduction volumes and profits soared in 2012, exceeding all expectations.

And because of wells like these in Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale formation, a glut of natural gas has developed nationwide.  Domestic prices for natural gas have dropped about one-third, since July, 2008 before the shale boom really took off.

But overseas, prices are three or four times that.  So drillers here want to ship their gas abroad. The economist for the American Petroleum Institute, John Felmy says exporting Marcellus Shale gas makes sense.

“Because it’s such a vast deposit,” says Felmy, “and developing it, of course, can be used to supply other states as we’re doing now. But there’s likely to be so much of it that exporting it at a very good price would help in terms of keeping production going.”

API’s John Felmy talks to StateImpact Pennsylvania about exports.

As the price has dropped, production in some of Pennsylvania’s gas fields has tailed off.

PIPELINES LEAD TO IDLED IMPORT TERMINAL

In what some call a stroke of luck, the wells across Pennsylvania could easily be connected to an existing interstate pipeline system, which links up to a nearby import terminal.

One of seven holding tanks at Dominion's Cove Point Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal.

LINDSAY LAZARSKI / WHYY/NEWSWORKS

One of seven holding tanks at Dominion’s Cove Point Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal.

That import facility lies about 320 miles south of Susquehanna County, on a spit of land jutting out into the Chesapeake Bay, where large white cylindrical tanks are surrounded by a network of 32-inch pipes. The Cove Point liquefaction plant is operated by Dominion Resources. And Dominion also owns and operates a pipeline system that connects these tanks to Pennsylvania’s gas fields. It was only a couple of years ago when plans for that system were to use it for storage and transport between different markets on the East Coast. Today, the company wants to reverse the flow, transporting shale gas to their export facility in Lusby, Md.

The onshore liquefaction plant sits surrounded by a nature preserve. To get to the offshore dock, visitors have to head down into a tunnel and use a bicycle to travel beneath the water to the pier that lies out in the middle of the Chesapeake Bay.

Before any natural gas gets shipped overseas, it has to be cooled to minus-260 degrees Fahrenheit, the point where it becomes liquid. Export plants that liquefy the gas cost billions of dollars to build. So what they want to do at Cove Point’s idled import facility is spend the relatively bargain basement price of $4 billion converting it to an export facility.

The last time a ship docked at this pier was on New Years Day of 2011. Since then, the seagulls have moved in and made it home.  Hideaways beneath large pipes hold nests with chirping chicks. A nearby dump provides scraps of food, which the nesting birds bring back safely to this deserted pier, leaving the white-washed dock littered with chicken bones and bird poop.

Liquefied natural gas technician Ernest Ortiz monitors the process from the offshore control center.  Ortiz says he would love to start seeing ships coming to the dock. The last one to unload LNG was on New Years Day, 2011.

LINDSAY LAZARSKI / WHYY/NEWSWORKS

Liquefied natural gas technician Ernest Ortiz monitors the process from the offshore control center. Ortiz says he would love to start seeing ships coming to the dock. The last one to unload LNG was on New Years Day, 2011.

Dominion Resources spokesman Dan Donovan says this facility would make one of the best places in the U.S. to export natural gas.

“We have a world class dock and pier,” says Donovan. “We have the storage, we have a pipeline into what is now the second largest natural gas field in the world.”

Donovan’s point about the pipelines is key.

The company’s plan for their pipeline system used to be to pump imported natural gas to states like New York, New Jersey and Ohio. But their plans have changed almost overnight.

“No one saw this coming,” says Donovan.

FUKUSHIMA AND THE SHALE GAS REVERSAL

And Dominion wasn’t the only industry player surprised by Marcellus Shale production.

Wolfgang Moehler is the director of global LNG, the shorthand for liquefied natural gas, for the firm IHS Global.

“[The years] 2007, 2008, the assumption was that the U.S. would become, in the next ten years, the largest gas importers in the world,” says Moehler.

But today, that assumption has been turned on its head, thanks in part to all those productive Marcellus Shale wells, and the March, 2011 nuclear disaster in Japan.

Japan’s energy situation changed dramatically back in March 2011. Before the meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, nuclear energy supplied a third of Japan’s needs. Where it once had 50 nuclear reactors, today the country is down to just two.

Photo taken from a Kyodo News helicopter over the town of Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, shows the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on July 9, 2013. Tokyo Electric Power Co., the operator of the crippled plant, said the same day that the density of radioactive cesium in groundwater by the sea at the plant has soared to around 90 times higher than three days ago.

KYODO/LANDOV

Photo taken from a Kyodo News helicopter over the town of Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, shows the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on Tuesday, July 9, 2013, more than two years after the meltdown. Tokyo Electric Power Co., the operator of the crippled plant, said the same day that the density of radioactive cesium in groundwater by the sea at the plant has soared to around 90 times higher than three days previous.

Analyst Wolfgang Moehler is watching a dramatic shift in the global LNG market, partly due to increasing energy needs in developing countries like India, and the loss of nuclear energy in Japan.

“So a significant amount of that electricity production had to be substituted from fossil fuel generation,” says Moehler.

Japan was already the world’s largest importer of natural gas, but since Fukushima, the pace has increased steadily. Moehler says Japan would love to snag some of that cheaper American gas coming from Pennsylvania’s gas fields. And Pennsylvania’s gas producers would love to sell at a higher price.

He explains that importing nations like Japan are locked into long-term natural gas contracts tied to the price of oil.

“The emergence of the U.S. now as a potential exporter opened up a competition,” said Moehler. [Energy companies in countries like Japan] could also go back to their traditional producers and say well we have a different opportunity, we have to renegotiate the price. So Fukushima has a very very strong impact on Japan’s decision making in that regard.”

SHIFTING GLOBAL LNG MARKETS

Photo shows the inside of the world's largest liquefied natural gas tank in Yokohama near Tokyo, unveiled by Tokyo Gas Co. on March 13, 2013.

KYODO/LANDOV

Photo shows the inside of the world’s largest liquefied natural gas tank in Yokohama near Tokyo, unveiled by Tokyo Gas Co. on March 13, 2013. Japan’s imports of LNG hit a monthly record of 8.23 million tons in January.

But Dominion Resources still has a number of hoops to jump through before it starts piping in Marcellus gas, liquefying it, and shipping it out. IHS analyst Wolfgang Moehler says despite current contracts with neighboring countries like Australia and Indonesia, it may still be cheaper for Japanese energy companies to pay for the Cove Point conversion, and the extra transportation costs of shipping LNG through the Panama Canal to the Pacific rim. This is how good a deal Marcellus Shale gas seems to companies in Japan. Sumitomo Corporation, a Japanese trading company and its U.S. affiliate Pacific Summit Energy, has agreed to help foot the almost $4 billion bill to convert Cove Point to a natural gas export terminal. That company, along with the U.S. affiliate of India’s GAIL Ltd., have signed 20-year service agreements with Dominion to provide natural gas. Sumitomo has since announced that the exported gas would be sold to Tokyo Gas and Kansai Electric Power.

First, the U.S. Department of Energy has to approve any deals with non-free-trade countries, and determine if they’re in the public good. Dominion’s Dan Donovan says they’re pretty confident their proposal will gain approval from the DOE. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission also has to weigh in. The state of Maryland has to issue about 30 different permits.

LNG EXPORT OPPONENTS

And not everyone is thrilled with LNG exports. American manufacturers don’t like the plan, because cheap natural gas has helped domestic factories become more cost-efficient.  They say exports would raise prices at home.

Listen to StateImpact’s interview with George Biltz of Dow Chemical.

On the environmental front the Sierra Club is challenging the Cove Point plan in court.

Sierra Club attorney Craig Segall says regulators should not turn a blind eye toward the impact of increased production in natural gas fields like Pennsylvania.

Cove Point Lighthouse sits within sight of the Cove Point LNG terminal.

LINDSAY LAZARSKI / WHYY/NEWSWORKS

Cove Point Lighthouse sits within sight of the Cove Point LNG terminal.

“So if that continues, you wind up making these really large national energy policy decisions,” says Segall, “not just here [in Cove Point] but cumulatively across all these terminals and never ask this serious question. This implies x percent increased methane emissions, y percent increased wastewater production, and as a result, increased wastewater capacity in the fracking states.”

Segall wants the federal government to study the larger upstream impacts.

Natural gas exports may be a good deal for drillers, their investors, and  landowners who leased their mineral rights. But Segall thinks more thought should be given to Pennsylvanians who get few of the benefits of drilling but most of the burdens.

So what would Segall say to someone living in Tokyo, facing rising energy costs?

“I think that’s absolutely the hardest question,” he told StateImpact.

Segall says renewables should be pursued. But in the meantime, he has no easy answer.

“But there’s always this question of equity,” he says. “There’s a question about how do we provide energy globally. And there’s the question about who suffers where energy is produced and who wins, upstream in Pennsylvania or anywhere along the supply chain.”

Segall also says the increased tanker traffic in the Chesapeake Bay could upset its already threatened ecosystem.

Dominion Resources says converting the Cove Point plant will create thousands of new jobs in Maryland and upstream in Pennsylvania.

The company expects the Department of Energy to make a decision on its application by the end of the year.